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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING: THE LIMITS OF
LIABILITY FOR ITEM 303 OMISSIONS AND THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT NEVER WAS
BRIAN CURRIE*
ABSTRACT
The implied private action for violations of SEC Rule 10b-5 has
a contentious history. When plaintiffs base such actions on representations of forward-looking information, however, the stakes are
even higher. Recently, the federal circuit courts revisited this
divisive issue while deciding whether an omission from required
disclosure of Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of
financial conditions and results of operations. The apparent disparity between the federal circuit courts has caused great consternation and uncertainty in the corporate legal sphere.
This Note will examine the origins and controversial history
of Rule 10b-5 private actions, discuss the treatment of MD&A omissions throughout the various federal circuits, offer a harmonized
reading that resolves the perceived difference between the circuits, and explain how this reading satiates the concerns of both
proponents and opponents of increased securities disclosure.
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5,
we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn.1
—Justice William Rehnquist
*J.D.

Candidate, 2017, William & Mary Law School; B.A., 2006, Purdue
University. Many thanks to my wife, Becky, and daughters, Felicity and Anastasia, for their unwavering support over the past three years. I am also
indebted to the staff and editorial board of the William & Mary Business Law
Review for their invaluable assistance in refining this Note for publication.
1 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Justice
Rehnquist penned this oft-quoted phrase when a case confronted the Court
with the prospect of extending Rule 10b-5 liability. Id.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, a great commotion has erupted around the “judicial
oak” of Rule 10b-5 private actions. At its center is the debate over
whether to include omissions from Item 303 of Regulation S-K
as a basis for satisfying the materiality prong of Rule 10b-5 liability.2 Within the last year, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals both ruled on whether an omission on Item 3033 of Regulation S-K 4 could satisfy the materiality standard for Rule
10b-55 civil actions.6 To the concern of many,7 the Second Circuit’s opinion announced that its decision was a clear split with
the Ninth Circuit.8
See generally Douglas Flaum, Kevin Broughel & Inna Coleman, Second Circuit Finds That Failure to Make Required Item 303 Disclosure Can Provide Basis
for Securities Fraud Claim, PAUL HASTINGS: STAY CURRENT (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=908de369-2334-64
28-811c-ff00004cbded [https://perma.cc/XDJ3-WU5S] (anticipating a Supreme
Court decision to settle the discrepancy); John Stigi & Madalyn Macarr, Second
Circuit Notes Split with Ninth Circuit Over Whether Failure to Make Adequate
Disclosures Under Item 303 of Regulation S-K May Serve as Basis for a Section 10(b) Claim, SHEPPARDMULLIN: CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http://
www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2015/01/second-circuit-notes-split-with-ninth
-circuit-over-whether-failure-to-make-adequate-disclosures-under-item-303-of
-regulation-s-k-may-serve-as-basis-for-a-section-10b-claim [https://perma.cc/U5
GN-2JVM] (noting a “clear” circuit court split that requires Supreme Court intervention to resolve); Jonathan C. Dickey & Noah F. Stern, Creating a Clear Circuit
Court Split, the Second Circuit Holds that Failure to Disclose Known Trends
Or Uncertainties Under Item 303 of Regulation S-K Creates Liability Under
Section 10(b), GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/pub
lications/Documents/Second-Circuit--Failure-to-Disclose-Known-Trends-or-Un
certainties-Under-Item-303--Regulation%20S-K-Creates-Liability.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LQ2X-HD2S] (cautioning clients to carefully review their Item 303
disclosures to prevent action from plaintiff’s attorneys); Michael Eisenkraft,
Can Silence Keep You Safe? New Debate On 10b-5 Liability, LAW360 (Jan. 20,
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/612920/can-silence-keep-you-safe-new
-debate-on-10b-5-liability [https://perma.cc/8S9D-CAEK] (predicting Supreme
Court intervention to resolve the circuit court split).
3 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016).
4 Id. § 229.
5 Id. § 240.10b-5.
6 See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015);
see also Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014).
7 See, e.g., Dickey & Stern, supra note 2, at 1.
8 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04.
2
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Because over half of all securities litigation in the United
States is adjudicated in these two jurisdictions,9 the immediate
reaction from the legal sphere was—understandably—to alert
corporate clients to the potentially disastrous consequences of
failing to carefully analyze their Item 303 disclosures in light of
the circuit split.10 Adding gravity to the debate, the Fifth Circuit
District Court for the District of Minnesota, in a subsequent decision, chose to follow the Second Circuit’s holding that Item 303
omissions can form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 action.11 Despite all
of the commotion, the Supreme Court chose not to address the
issue when given the opportunity.12
This Note explores the background and origins of the Ninth
and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals’ opinions, identifies a way
of reading the two opinions to resolve the superficial differences
between them, and argues that such a harmonized reading of
those decisions satisfies the major concerns of both proponents
and opponents of private securities litigation. Part I gives context
to the current debate over Item 303 by explaining the history
and requirements of Item 303 and its role in the broader scheme
of Regulation S-K and Rule 10b-5—the plaintiffs’ basis for relief
in both Cohen and Stratte-McClure. Part II explores the specific
factual and legal reasoning behind Oran13—the case upon which
the split circuits both claim to base their reasoning—as well as
how treatment of that case differed between Cohen, StratteMcClure, and Beaver County. Finally, Part III discusses how the
inclusion of Item 303 as a possible basis for Rule 10b-5 violations will satisfy the concerns of both opponents and supporters
of private Rule 10b-5 litigation.

9 See FAIZAL KARIM & ANTHONY GALLO, COMING INTO FOCUS: 2014 SECURITIES
LITIGATION STUDY 21 (Neil Keenan & Patricia Etzold eds., 2015), https://
www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-securities-litiga
tion-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FTD-QZMS].
10 See generally Flaum et al., supra note 2; Dickey & Stern, supra note 2.
11 Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d
1035, 1047 (D. Minn. 2015).
12 Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 2349 (2015).
13 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).
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I. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS FOR DISCLOSURE
OF FORWARD-LOOKING “SOFT INFORMATION”
A. The History of Forward-Looking Disclosures
Because forward-looking projections are little more than educated estimates, securities specialists refer to it as “soft information.” 14 Prior to 1972, the Securities Act of 1933 15 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 16 generally prohibited projection—that is, “forward-looking” filings.17 Although a full history
of such disclosures is beyond the scope of this Note, a fundamental
understanding of the reasoning behind such omissions is necessary.
Generally, supporters of such an approach gave three rationales for the exclusion of these forward-looking projections. 18
First, supporters believed that the government’s duty was to
protect unsophisticated investors from “their own ignorance” regarding whether soft information was reliable or not.19 Second,
proponents believed (paradoxically, in light of the first rationale)
that investors were capable of making their own predictions
regarding a corporation’s future performance. 20 The third and
final justification was that forward-looking projections were not
“facts” per se.21
Using the term “soft information” to refer to a corporation’s future condition or performance contrasts with the idea of “hard” information, which is
known, unchangeable, historical data about a corporation’s past performance.
SHARON L. FULLEN, HOW TO GET FINANCING FOR YOUR NEW SMALL BUSINESS:
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS FROM THE EXPERTS WHO DO IT EVERY DAY 213 (2006)
(defining “soft” information as opinions, guesses, and prediction in the context of securities law); Joel Seligman, Colloquium: The SEC’s Unfinished Soft
Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1953 (1995) (contrasting
the nature of “soft information” and “hard information”).
15 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).
16 Id. § 78a.
17 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 230 (6th ed. 2011).
18 Id.
19 Id. (quoting Report of the Advisory Comm. on Corp. Disclosure to the
SEC, H.R. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
348 (Comm. Print 1977)).
20 LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 230.
21 Id.
14
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By the 1970s, however, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) policy against allowing forward-looking disclosures faced serious criticism.22 In the face of such criticism, the
SEC ultimately capitulated and gave forward-looking statements a
permanent home in SEC filings under Regulation S-K. 23 The
subsequent two decades saw an increasingly litigious atmosphere and greater prominence of forward-looking statements.24
Concurrently, the SEC slowly moved from “an emphasis on hard
facts to ... [an] emphasis on ... predictive information.”25
In 1989, the SEC adopted Item 303, the centerpiece of the
current firestorm.26 Commentators have referred to Item 303 as
“the most important textual disclosure item in Regulation S-K.”27
Textually, Item 303 requires managers to disclose the corporation’s financial status, any changes in such financial condition,
and anticipated results of operations.28 While Item 303 lists several subcategories,29 perhaps the most onerous for management
is the requirement of subsection (a)(3)(ii).30 Subsection (a)(3)(ii)—
regarding the “results of operations”—requires managers to perform the following:
See JEREMY L. WIESEN, REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES 311–19
(1975) (offering a critique of the SEC’s disclosure requirements and their
shortfalls, including references to ongoing efforts to include forward-looking
statements in disclosures); see also Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants,
Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197–98 (1970)
(offering another scathing critique of many SEC policies and asserting that
investors are most interested, inter alia, in earnings projections).
23 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 231–35.
24 Id. at 236. For a complete account of this remarkable turnaround in
SEC disclosure policy, see generally Joel Seligman, Colloquium: The SEC’s
Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953 (1995).
25 LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 265.
26 MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 166 (6th ed. 2014);
see also 43 SEC Docket 1330 (1989).
27 LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 264. Item 303 has given rise to a fair
amount of private litigation, and the liability for Item 303 omissions under
the Securities Act of 1933 is well established. See generally Silverstrand Invs.
v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing liability under
§ 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for Item 303 omissions); J&R Mktg., SEP v.
GMC, 549 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing liability under § 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933 for Item 303 omissions).
28 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2011).
29 Id. § (a)(1)–(5).
30 Id. § (a)(3)(ii).
22
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[D]escribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had
or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material
favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or
income from continuing operations. If the registrant knows of
events that will cause a material change in the relationship
between costs and revenues ... the change in the relationship
shall be disclosed.31

Management must file Item 303 disclosures on an annual basis.32
Furthermore, any “material” changes in operations or financial
condition must be updated as required in the interim period.33
The SEC provides instructions about weighing the materiality—
the threshold standard for disclosure requirements—of forward-looking information in Item 303. 34 The agency requires
that management make two assessments in determining materiality for the purposes of Item 303 disclosure.35 First, management
must reasonably assess the likelihood of a known trend or uncertainty coming to fruition.36 If the answer to this inquiry is
“low,” then no disclosure is required.37 On the other hand, if no
determination can be reasonably made, management must objectively assess the consequences if this trend or uncertainty
occurs.38 Management must disclose this information unless it
determines that the known trend or uncertainty is not reasonably likely to have a material effect on the corporation’s financial
condition or results of operations.39
From their humble beginnings, forward-looking statements have
seen a remarkable rise to becoming the centerpiece of securities
litigation. 40 Equally remarkable is that the failure to submit
Id.
Id. § (a).
33 Id. § (b).
34 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429–30 (May 24, 1989).
35 Id. at 22,430.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for ForwardLooking Statements: An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity
Precludes the Meaningful Cautionary Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519,
520–21 (2010) (commenting on the growth of forward-looking statements from
prohibited disclosure to “the most common basis for a private damage claim
under the federal securities laws”).
31
32
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forward-looking disclosures, a once prohibited practice, now triggers
a whole host of serious SEC enforcement actions. 41 Forwardlooking statements have become an increasingly dangerous source
of liability and consternation for corporate firms and their legal
counsel.42 In their current context, the importance of forwardlooking disclosures has combined with Item 303’s detailed
standard for materiality to create the current discrepancy among
the circuit courts of appeals.43
B. Standard for Actionable Omissions Under Rule 10b-5
In order to understand how the requirements of Item 303
contrast and overlap with the materiality of Rule 10b-5 (and,
thus, lay the foundation for understanding the current circuit
court split), a basic understanding of Rule 10b-5’s history and
judicial standards merit discussion. Rule 10b-5 was first promulgated in 1942 pursuant to authority granted under § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.44 While originally designed
Under the 1933 Act, misstatements or omissions on required forward-looking
disclosures can lead to criminal or civil sanctions under sections 11, 12(a)(1),
12(a)(2), or 17(a). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(1), 77l(a)(2), 77(q) (2012).
42 See generally Robert J. Mallonek & Paul A. Serritella, ‘Panther Partners’ and Disclosure of Trends Under Item 303, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 11, 2012),
LEXIS (discussing the broadening liability for Item 303 omissions and noting
that interest in liability for forward-looking statements is growing); Matthew
L. Mustokoff, Is Item 303 Liability under the Securities Act Becoming a
“Trend”?, http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/email
/summer2012/summer2012-0912-is-item-303-liability-under-securities-act-be
coming-trend.html [https://perma.cc/S5D4-J7KN] (discussing the increasing
liability for Item 303 omissions under various provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933).
43 One line from the Federal Register—relied upon by the circuit courts in
their decisions—nicely illustrates the underlying legal headache regarding
the materiality of Item 303 omissions: “the ... test for materiality approved by
the Supreme Court [for Rule 10b-5] ... is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.”
54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989).
44 Justin Marocco, When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule
10b-5 Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L.
REV. 633, 633 (2013); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291,
§ 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)) (prohibiting the use of “manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security, and impliedly granting the SEC enforcement power via “necessary or appropriate” rules and regulations); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2015).
41
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as a gap-filling measure,45 it took less than four years for this
agency-empowering rule to spawn an implied private right of action.46 Eventually the Supreme Court “established that a private
right of action is implied under [Rule 10b-5].”47
The elements of the implied private action under Rule 10b-5
claims are (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter;
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation. 48 As mentioned
above, the current circuit court split revolves around the materiality requirement—specifically the idea of a “material omission.”
In its seminal decision, the Supreme Court held in Basic v.
Levinson that an actionable statement (or omission) must be
misleading, but that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
misleading under Rule 10b-5.” 49 Regarding required forwardlooking disclosures, the Court formulated a specific test for the
materiality of such statements: courts must “balanc[e] ... both
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company activity.”50
C. Special Considerations for Private Securities Litigation Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA)51 to protect defendants from frivolous class
action suits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 52 The
45 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK
§ 27:2 (2015 ed.). Considering the prominence of Rule 10b-5 in modern securities jurisprudence, it is interesting to note that an ad-hoc committee very
hastily drafted the rule in less than a day. See Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium
Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1–S2 (1993).
46 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
47 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
48 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011).
49 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
50 Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
51 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2011)); see also BLOOMENTHAL &
WOLF, supra note 45, § 1:15.
52 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 45, § 1:15.
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most obvious protection of the PSLRA, the “safe harbor” provisions, would apply to the inclusion of Item 303 omissions.53 The
“safe harbor” provisions of the PSLRA offer blanket protection
for forward-looking “soft information” in three circumstances:
(1) the statement is identified as forward-looking and is
accompanied by sufficient cautionary statements;
(2) the statement is immaterial; or
(3) if the plaintiff is unable—with regards to a natural
person defendant—to adequately show scienter or—with
regards to a corporate defendant—to prove that the
statement was made by (or with approval of) an executive officer.54
While the impossibility of qualifying an omission as “forwardlooking” excludes the first possible “safe harbor,” the second and
third provisions above apply directly to provision Item 303 omissions.55 Notably, these “safe harbors” played a significant role in
the litigation in both Cohen and Stratte-McClure.56
II. TREATMENT OF ITEM 303 OMISSIONS IN RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS
AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals—Oran v. Stafford
In coming to their respective holdings regarding actionability
of Item 303 omissions, the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of
Appeals (as well as the district court for the District of Minnesota)
relied heavily on a Third Circuit Court of Appeals opinion authored
by then-Judge Alito that pre-dated his Supreme Court tenure.57
Id. § 28:6.
Id. (emphasis added).
55 See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir.
2015) (noting that an omission that satisfies the Item 303 materiality test would
also need to pass a heightened standard of materiality); Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp.,
768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Item 303 disclosures on
which plaintiffs based their claim failed to satisfy the “materiality” requirement).
56 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056.
57 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055–56; Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1035,
1047–48 (D. Minn. 2015).
53
54
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1. The Background to Oran v. Stafford
Oran was an appeal of summary judgment against the plaintiffpurchasers in favor of the defendant-corporation.58 The district
court found that plaintiffs failed to plead any material misstatement or omission as required by Rule 10b-5.59 The plaintiffs
contended that the defendants (American Home Products Corporation and certain officers and directors) had violated Rule
10b-5 by failing to disclose information regarding the potential
negative side effects of the corporation’s pharmaceutical products. 60 The district court 61 dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints
for failing to state a material omission.62 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in holding that a
violation of Item 303 cannot satisfy the materiality prong of a
Rule 10b-5 private securities claim.63
2. The Holding in Oran
In addressing the plaintiffs’ claims regarding Item 303, the
Third Circuit first resolved the question of whether Item 303
creates an independent private right of action.64 Although a previous appellate decision had left this question open,65 the Third
Circuit spared little time rejecting this proposition—disposing of
the idea in two sentences.66
Plaintiffs further contended, in the alternative, that Item 303
“imposes an affirmative duty of disclosure ... that, if violated, would
constitute a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”67 In coming to
its decision, the Third Circuit considered the disparity regarding
the definition of “materiality” for the purpose of Item 303 as
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 288.
60 See id. at 275–80.
61 Oran v. Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.N.J. 1999).
62 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (thoroughly discussing
10b-5’s materiality requirement regarding omissions).
63 Oran, 226 F.3d at 281.
64 Id. at 287.
65 Id. (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,
1418 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)).
66 Id.
67 Id. (emphasis added).
58
59
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compared with that for the purpose of establishing Rule 10b-5
liability.68 The court noted “[the Item 303 disclosure] test varies
considerably from the general test for securities fraud materiality set
out by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.”69 Most damning, however, was the SEC’s own assessment of the different
standards—stating that the Rule 10b-5 standard from Basic is
“inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.”70
In its ultimate conclusion on the matter, the Third Circuit
held that, because Item 303’s materiality standards required
more than Rule 10b-5, “a violation of [Item 303’s] reporting requirements does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”71 The court, however, also penned language
requiring that plaintiffs “must ... separately show” a Rule 10b-5
duty to disclose and that perhaps an Item 303 disclosure could
support a Rule 10b-5 claim.72
The Oran opinion suggests that the plaintiffs’ mistake was
not in using an Item 303 omission as the basis for a Rule 10b-5
action, but rather an insufficient pleading.73 The opinion notes
that materiality under Item 303’s disclosure requirements does
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that such disclosure is also
material as required under Rule 10b-5.74 As noted above, the Third
Circuit fell far short of claiming that an Item 303 omission can
never form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 action.75 Rather, the appellate
decision only suggests that an Item 303 omission must be properly pled as satisfying the heightened standard for Rule 10b-5
omissions.76 This ruling, while apparently clear on its face, laid
the foundation for the current controversy between the Second
and Ninth Circuits’ readings of Oran.

Id. at 287–88.
Id. at 288.
70 Id. (quoting 54 Fed. Reg. 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989)).
71 Id. (emphasis added). This emphasized language will become important
in reconciling the Second and Ninth Circuit opinions below.
72 Id. (emphasis added).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See supra notes 70–71, and accompanying text.
76 Oran, 226 F.3d at 288.
68
69
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B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp.
1. The Background to Cohen
Cohen, similar to Oran, involved a class action securities litigation against a corporate defendant. 77 Plaintiffs claimed that
NVIDIA Corp. (NVIDIA), a manufacturer of computer chips and
semiconductors, had failed to disclose material information regarding potential problems with the solder used on its microchips.78 When the problems with the solder became widely known,
NVIDIA’s share price dropped by 31 percent. 79 Consequently,
plaintiff-investors filed suit under, inter alia, the theory that
NVIDIA and its directors had violated Rule 10b-5 by omitting
the known solder issues from its Item 303 disclosures.80
2. The Cohen Court’s Reading of Oran and Ultimate Holding
Cohen, like Oran, was an appeal of summary judgment against
the plaintiff-purchasers in favor of the defendant-corporation for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.81 Specifically, the district court took issue with the plaintiffs’ inadequate pleading of both scienter and materiality in relation to their
Rule 10b-5 claim.82 The plaintiffs contended that NVIDIA violated
Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose reports of serious defects in its
computer chips.83 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the
district court erred in holding that violation of Item 303 could not
satisfy the materiality prong of a Rule 10b-5 claim.84 Subsequently,
the court—relying in part on its reading of Oran—held that Item
303 does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Rule 10b-5.85
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit began echoing
the analysis laid out in Oran by comparing the materiality
Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1048–51 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
79 Id. at 1050–51.
80 Id. at 1051.
81 Id. at 1048; Oran, 226 F.3d at 281.
82 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1048; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub.
L. 73-291, § 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77j(b) (2012)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
83 See Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1048–51.
84 Id. at 1048.
85 Id. at 1056.
77
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requirements of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5. 86 The Cohen court
went further than Oran’s analysis: it added that “[m]anagement’s
duty to disclose under Item 303 is much broader than what is
required under the standard [for Rule 10b-5].”87 Also similar to
Oran, the Ninth Circuit noted that even the strongest cases supporting the plaintiffs’ position were unavailing.88
The language of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate holding in Cohen
closely mirrors that of Oran.89 The court held that “Item 303 does
not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.90 Such a duty to disclose must be separately shown according
to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic and
Matrixx Initiatives.”91 This language seems to implicate that the
plaintiffs’ Item 303 claim did not run afoul of some newly created
blanket immunity from Rule 10b-5 liability for Item 303 omissions,
but that the language failed to adequately plead such an omission satisfied the Rule 10b-5 standard (the “something more”).92
C. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals—Stratte-McClure v.
Morgan Stanley
1. The Background of Stratte-McClure
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley also involved a class action
lawsuit by plaintiff-investors against a corporate defendant.93 Here,
Id. at 1055; accord. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288.
Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055.
88 Plaintiffs relied upon a District of Rhode Island case from 1996, in which the
court stated that Item 303 imposed an “affirmative duty to disclose.” Simon v. Am.
Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 (D.R.I. 1996). However, that point
was clarified in a later opinion by the same District Judge, noting that “plaintiffs
may not rely solely upon Item 303 to prove materiality in violation of Rule 10b-5.”
Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D.R.I. 2002).
89 Compare Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056 (“[A] duty to disclose [on Item 303 for the
purposes of establishing Rule 10b-5 liability] must be separately shown according
to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic and Matrixx Initiatives.”),
with Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (“A violation of [Item] 303’s reporting requirements
does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5.
Because plaintiffs have failed to plead any actionable misrepresentation or
omission under [Rule 10b-5], [Item] 303 cannot provide a basis for liability.”).
90 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056.
91 Id. (emphasis added).
92 Id. at 1054–56.
93 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2015).
86
87

394 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:379
the corporate defendant was investment firm Morgan Stanley.94
Plaintiffs contended that Morgan Stanley failed to disclose its losses
in the subprime mortgage market.95 Morgan Stanley’s extensive
exposure in this area would eventually cost the firm billions of
dollars as the subprime market began to collapse.96 As the market
reacted to this news, the firm’s stock price fell by 29 percent.97
Consequently, plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the firm had deceptively omitted this information from its Item 303 filings.98
2. The Stratte-McClure Court’s Reading of Oran and Cohen
and Ultimate Holding
Similar to the district court’s disposition in Cohen, the District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed plaintiffs’
suit for failure to state a claim.99 In analyzing the issue on appeal, the court of appeals addressed—and offered a scathing rebuke
of—the Cohen opinion’s treatment of Item 303 omissions in the
context of Rule 10b-5100 actions.101 Specifically, the Stratte-McClure
court took issue with Cohen’s reading of Oran v. Stafford.102 In
its reasoning regarding the Item 303 liability issue, the Second
Circuit relied on the similarities between Rule 10b-5 and other
provisions of the securities laws. 103 The Second Circuit noted
that it had already held that an Item 303 omission could form
Id.
Id. at 97–98.
96 Id. at 97.
97 Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant and Movant-Appellant
at 20, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 130627-CV).
98 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 96.
99 Id.
100 Within the Stratte-McClure opinion’s text, the court alternates between
referencing Section 10(b) liability (the statutory text) and Rule 10b-5 liability
(the regulatory liability). Id. at 96, 100–04, 106–08. Because Section 10(b) liability
arises out of a violation of Rule 10b-5, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b),
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (prohibiting the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in violation of the SEC’s rules (including Rule 10b-5)), this Note
simplifies the nomenclature by referring to Rule 10b-5 wherever possible.
101 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 101–02.
94
95
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the basis for a claim under Sections 11 and 12(a)104 of the Securities Act of 1933.105 The Second Circuit further noted that its
likely treatment of Item 303 omissions under Rule 10b-5 had
been foreshadowed in several previous decisions. 106 Bolstering
its basis for analogizing to Section 12(a) liability, the Second
Circuit noted that both Sections 12(a) and Rule 10b-5 require
the disclosure of “material fact[s] necessary in order to make ...
statements made ... not misleading.”107
Having established its basis for including Item 303 disclosures within the realm of possible bases for Rule 10b-5 liability,
the court proceeded to qualify its holding.108 The court noted that
the standards for Item 303 disclosure and the standards required by Rule 10b-5’s materiality test differed significantly.109
Moreover, the court, similar to its Third and Ninth Circuit counterparts, cautiously pointed out that the SEC itself noted that
the material standards for Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 are “inapposite.”110 Ultimately, the Second Circuit laid down a simple test:
Item 303 disclosures can only form a basis for Rule 10b-5 claims
if they meet the higher materiality standard that already exists
for omissions under that rule.111
Despite a difference in the legal reasoning—and antagonistic
language—the Second Circuit came to the same conclusion as
the Ninth Circuit in Cohen.112 Although the court went to great
lengths to establish that an Item 303 omission could satisfy the
materiality standard under Rule 10b-5, 113 the Second Circuit
still upheld the district court’s dismissal.114 This result means
See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, §§ 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82–83 (1933)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §77k (2012)) (regarding liability arising from
registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (regarding liability arising from
prospectuses or oral communications).
105 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101–02.
106 Id. at 102.
107 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
108 Id. at 102–03.
109 Id. The same language was used in both of the previously discussed
opinions. See supra notes 68–71, 89–91 and accompanying text.
110 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 102–03.
113 Id. at 100, 107–08.
114 Id. at 100, 108.
104
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that two circuit courts with factually similar scenarios coming to
the same outcome have created a circuit court split in the process.
D. The District Court for the District of Minnesota—Beaver
County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc.
Although Beaver County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. Tile
Shop Holdings, Inc. is not an appellate court decision, its facts
and analysis are indicative of how subsequent district court decisions will handle the issue of Item 303 omissions.
1. The Background to Tile Shop
In Tile Shop, the district court was asked to rule on defendant’s
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that they had omitted
material information from their Item 303 filing and, consequently,
had violated Rule 10b-5.115 The defendant corporation (Tile Shop)
and its officers had been involved in several questionable dealings
as a provider of stone and tile products.116 The company failed to
disclose its increasing reliance on certain trading partners. 117
Ultimately, an independent report detailed these relationships
and noted that Tile Shop’s earnings had been overstated as a result of the favorable dealings between these trading partners.118
Consequently, Tile Shop’s stock fell significantly.119
2. The Tile Shop Court’s Reading of Oran, Cohen, and
Stratte-McClure
The District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the
approaches, reasoning, and readings of Oran presented by both
the Second and the Ninth Circuits.120 The court ultimately found
the Second Circuit’s reasoning more persuasive.121 The Tile Shop
Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp.
3d 1035, 1044–48 (D. Minn. 2015).
116 Id. at 1042–43.
117 Id. at 1043–44.
118 Id. at 1043.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1047–48.
121 Id. at 1047.
115
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court believed that Stratte-McClure correctly read the standard
outlined in Oran, and, accordingly, the Tile Shop court adopted
the same standard for its own review. 122 The district court’s
opinion, however, differs importantly from the circuit court opinions noted above. The court, unlike those appellate decisions, upheld
the Rule 10b-5 claim premised on an Item 303 omission.123 That
is, the court allowed the claim to survive the defendants’ motions to dismiss.124
III. DISPELLING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT MYTH
Upon a basic understanding of the background and reasoning
among the circuit courts, it is easy to assume that a circuit court
split exists. After all, the Second Circuit and the District Court
for the District of Minnesota both outright acknowledge the
split.125 Two important aspects of this circuit court divergence,
however, cast light on the legitimacy of this “split.”126 First, it is
not entirely clear that the Second Circuit’s opinion on the issue
is binding legal precedent.127 Secondly, assuming, arguendo, that
the pertinent language of the Stratte-McClure opinion was indeed
a precedential holding, some doubt still remains about whether or
not these holdings are wholly inconsistent and irreconcilable.128
A. The Second Circuit’s Opinion on Item 303 Omissions May Be
Non-Binding Dicta
When this issue was filed with the Supreme Court in a petition
for certiorari, the Cohen defendants’ brief asserted that the
Stratte-McClure opinion’s discussion of Item 303’s duty to disclose is nothing more than dicta.129 A case usually is not treated
Id. at 1047–48.
Id. at 1060–61.
124 Id.
125 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015);
Tile Shop, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 1047.
126 The Cohen defendants briefed each of these aspects in opposition to the
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Brief in Opposition at 12–17,
Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015) (No. 14-975) [hereinafter
Brief in Opposition].
127 Id. at 13.
128 Id. at 13–15.
129 Id. at 13.
122
123
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as authority with regard to any point of law not necessary to
decide the case or specifically raised before the court. 130 This
contention, upon a cursory glance of the Stratte-McClure opinion, appears to be well founded. The plaintiffs’ action in StratteMcClure was, after all, dismissed on grounds of scienter, thus
negating the need to discuss the materiality standard and the
sufficiency of Item 303 omissions.131 The Cohen defendants’ Brief
in Opposition also correctly notes that the Second Circuit itself
has previously identified dicta as a statement that is “unnecessary to the decision in the case.”132
Despite the arguments that the language in Stratte-McClure
is largely dicta and non-binding, it is worth noting that there is
equal authority to suggest that such a statement is binding on
lower courts. The district courts within the Second Circuit have
consistently held that pronouncements of the court of appeals
that appear as dicta must be “regarded as the law of the Circuit,
even though not ... a necessary step in the reasoning leading to a
holding.”133 Moreover, a substantial line of cases already exists
that tangentially allude to the possibility of Rule 10b-5 liability
for Item 303 omissions within the Second Circuit.134
Most fatal to the argument that the Second Circuit’s opinion
lacks precedential value is the mere fact that the appellate court
devoted so much time to directly address this specific point of
law.135 Despite the plaintiffs’ failure to address the materiality
130 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 130 (2016) (citing Blue Cross and Blue Shield
of Neb., Inc. v. Dailey, 687 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 2004)).
131 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015). In
fact, the court itself acknowledged that its discussion of Item 303 was unnecessary: “We assume, arguendo, that this [Item 303] omission was material
under Basic. We nonetheless affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
claim[.]” Id.
132 Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at 13.
133 United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 540 (2d Cir. 1990); see also In re
Calvary Const., Inc., 496 B.R. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Patsy’s Italian Rest., Inc.
v. Banas, 508 F. Supp. 2d 194, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
134 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101 n.4; see also In re Scholastic Corp.
Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that Item 303 omissions could
contribute to an adequately pled violation of Rule 10b-5); In re Corning, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 349 F. Supp. 2d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that a district court
must give Item 303 consideration when evaluating claims under Rule 10b-5).
135 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100–04.
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issue in their appellate brief, 136 the Court of Appeals devoted
nearly half of its discussion to commenting on the issue.137 Given
the importance attached to court of appeal’s dicta in the Second
Circuit and the amount of effort that the Stratte-McClure court
spent reasoning and justifying its comments, it is unlikely that
any district court within the Second Circuit would render a contrary ruling when faced with similar facts.
B. The Opinions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of
Appeals Can Be Harmonized into a Single, Coherent Holding
Assuming, arguendo, that the Stratte-McClure opinion’s ruling
regarding Item 303 omissions is certain to persuade any district
court faced with the same issue,138 a convincing argument can
be made that there is no significant difference in the treatment
of the issue under Stratte-McClure and Cohen. In sum, the Second Circuit declared that its decision was contrary to the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion when, in reality, it was not.139
As the Cohen defendants’ Brief in Opposition notes, a careful
reading of both decisions reveals that the two opinions agree on
several points.140 First, both courts agree that disclosure requirements are broader under Item 303 than under Basic’s requirement for Rule 10b-5.141 Second, the opinions agree that an Item
303 omission does not automatically establish materiality under
Basic’s Rule 10b-5 standard.142 Third, and most importantly, the
136 Plaintiffs’ appeal fails to plead materiality according to the standards
outlined in Basic and Matrixx Initiatives. See generally Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant and Movant-Appellant, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan
Stanley, No. 13-0627-CV (2d Cir. May 29, 2013).
137 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100–04.
138 There can be little doubt that this would be the result of any subsequent Rule 10b-5 action premised on an Item 303 omission that satisfies the
Court’s Basic standard for materiality.
139 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.
140 Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at 13–14.
141 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (“Item 303’s disclosure obligations extend
considerably beyond those required by Rule 10b-5.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)); Cohen v.
NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Management’s duty to disclose under Item 303 is much broader than what is required under ... Basic.”).
142 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102, 103 (“The failure to make a required disclosure under Item 303 ... is not by itself sufficient to state a claim ... under [Rule
10b-5].”); Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055 (“[T]he ‘demonstration of a violation of the
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opinions both conclude that a plaintiff must allege that the
omission independently satisfies Basic’s heightened standard in
order to sustain a Rule 10b-5 action.143
Excluding the Second Circuit’s critique of the Cohen opinion,
the two opinions display only subtle differences in their approach
to the question. Moreover, the two opinions’ holdings are not contrary. Rather, they are complementary. A future district court could
reasonably read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as considering whether
an omission that satisfies Item 303’s materiality standard imputes
liability automatically under Rule 10b-5 without any further allegations.144 The answer is, obviously, “no.”145 The same hypothetical
district court could reasonably read the Second Circuit’s opinion
as considering whether an omission that satisfies both Item 303 and
Rule 10b-5 materiality standards can support a Rule 10b-5 action.146 The answer is “yes.”147 The two answers are not mutually
exclusive. Both courts agree that an Item 303 omission that satisfies
the lower Item 303 materiality standard but fails the higher Rule
10b-5 standard cannot carry the day on a motion to dismiss.148
Finally, the Cohen opinion still leaves open the question of
whether an Item 303 disclosure could potentially form the basis
of a Rule 10b-5 action.149 Theoretically, a Ninth Circuit district
court considering a motion to dismiss when an Item 303 omission
disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion
that such disclosure would be required under Rule 10b-5.’”) (quoting Oran v.
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)).
143 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (“[P]laintiff must first allege that the
defendant failed to comply with Item 303 .... [P]laintiff must then allege that
the omitted information was material under Basic’s ... test.”); Cohen, 768
F.3d at 1056 (finding that plaintiffs could rely solely upon an Item 303 omission, but must also separately show materiality “according to the principles
set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic.”).
144 See Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056.
145 Id.
146 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.
147 Id.
148 Id. (“[A] violation of Item 303’s disclosure requirements can only sustain a claim under ... Rule 10b-5 if the allegedly omitted information satisfies
Basic’s test for materiality.”); Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056 (“[A] duty to disclose
[under Rule 10b-5] must be separately shown according to the principles set
forth by the Supreme Court in Basic[.]”).
149 See Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1054–56 (failing to state that an Item 303 omission could not form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 disclosure; instead, merely stating
that Item 303 by itself does not create a duty under Rule 10b-5).
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has been properly plead to simultaneously satisfy both the Item
303 materiality standard150 and the higher Rule 10b-5 standard
as laid out in Basic151 would not be required to dismiss the case
because of the Cohen precedent152—nor would the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals be bound to overrule such a dismissal on appeal.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN FAVOR OF THE
HARMONIZED READING
A. The Harmonized Reading Increases Market Accuracy
When traders are given more quality information regarding a
certain stock, they are better able to effectively establish a security’s actual value.153 Traders do this out of a belief that current
stock prices are inherently incorrect—that is, they cannot reflect all
available information.154 While the ultimate motive for any investigation is almost certainly personal profit,155 the tangential benefits
that accrue to the market from accurate pricing are important.156
It is generally believed that markets and society in general
are better off when stock prices more accurately reflect their
true value.157 More specifically, the more accurately a security’s
price reflects its true value, the more efficient society’s allocation
of resources becomes. 158 It has been argued that increasingly
accurate stock prices allow investors to more effectively identify and select those corporations with superior prospects. 159
That is, the “trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty” is likely to
come to fruition, or a determination cannot be made and will likely have a
material effect on the corporation’s financial condition or results of operations.
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427,
22,430 (May 24, 1989).
151 That is, the forward-looking statement is material after balancing the
likelihood that it will come to fruition and the anticipated magnitude of its
impact. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988).
152 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1054–55.
153 Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 132 (2015).
154 Id. at 131–32.
155 Id. at 132–33.
156 Id. at 133–34.
157 Id. at 123–24.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 137.
150
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Conversely, increasingly inaccurate markets lead to a poorer
allocation of resources.160 In this sense, market accuracy cuts as
a double-edged sword, simultaneously allocating resources to
high-potential corporations while diverting them away from lowpotential corporations.161
The harmonized reading would incentivize firms to take a
more cautious approach to their Item 303 filings—favoring
over-inclusive disclosure of potentially material information.
These increased disclosures would allow markets to maintain a
high level of accuracy162 and, thus, prevent the ignorant, inefficient allocation of resources to firms with serious flaws. As an
illustration, in Oran, Cohen, Stratte-McClure, and Tile Shop,
each of the four plaintiffs argued that the respective defendantcorporations’ stock did not accurately reflect the risks associated
with its purchase.163 If investors had had access to information
regarding the various faults of these firms through a complete
Item 303 disclosure, then their knowledge would have likely
affected the price of the respective corporations’ stocks. Armed
with an accurate price and increased knowledge, the market
would have reacted by reallocating resources away from suboptimal firms and into those which carried less risk.
B. PSLRA Protections Prevent Meritless Strike-Suits Under the
Harmonized Reading
While proponents of disclosure often tout the “market accuracy”
argument,164 many scholars who oppose this view argue with
Id. at 137–38.
Id. at 137.
162 See id. at 126, 182.
163 In Oran, the stock price allegedly was an inaccurate reflection of the
risk associated with the pharmaceutical’s side effects. See Oran v. Stafford, 226
F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2000). In Cohen, the stock price did not accurately reflect the
risk associated with the faulty solder. See Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046,
1048, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2014). In Stratte-McClure the stock price did not accurately reflect the risk associated with an extensive exposure to the credit-default
market. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 98, 104 (2d Cir.
2015). In Tile Shop, the stock price did not accurately reflect the truth behind the
source of the corporation’s profit margins. See Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund
v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1050–52 (D. Minn. 2015).
164 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, LAW & CONTEMP. LEGAL PROBS., Summer 1999, at 113 (noting the
160
161
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equal voracity; they argue that securities laws have gone too far and
have caused an enormous amount of baseless strike suits to the
benefit of plaintiffs’ attorneys alone. 165 Many look no further
than the skyrocketing cost of defending class action securities fraud
lawsuits.166 From this viewpoint, Item 303 omissions may seem to
be a frightening new arrow in the class action plaintiff’s quiver.
To give corporations some additional protection from the onslaught of private class action lawsuits under Rule 10b-5, Congress
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in
1996.167 The PSLRA—in conjunction with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure168—raises the standard for a private securities
action to survive a motion to dismiss.169 Per these requirements,
plaintiffs who wish to premise a Rule 10b-5 action on a material
omission—such as an Item 303 omission under the harmonized
reading of Cohen and Stratte-McClure—must plead “with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”170 The most important
wrinkle to this heightened requirement is that a plaintiff must
overcome this hurdle before proceeding with discovery.171 A plaintiff, therefore, without access to discovery tools such as depositions
or document production, must state particularized facts regarding board room discussions or decisions about SEC filings (e.g.,
Item 303)—a difficult task.172
Under the harmonized reading, however, the materiality
prong of the PSLRA’s “safe harbor” provisions still applies to
benefits of increased accuracy that result directly from increased disclosure
in the context of share price and the market for corporate control).
165 See generally ANDREW J. PINCUS, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL
REFORM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS: THE COST
TO INVESTORS OF TODAY’S PRIVATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM FAR
OUTWEIGHS ANY BENEFITS (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/up
loads/sites/1/Securities_Class_Actions_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUA9-5TET].
166 Id. at 6 (noting that legal fees for such suits can run into the hundreds
of millions of dollars).
167 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 45, § 27:11.
168 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Nine requires plaintiffs to plead the
circumstances surrounding allegations of fraud with “particularity.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b).
169 See BLOOMENTHAL &WOLF, supra note 45, § 29:1–2.
170 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012).
171 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 45, § 29:1.
172 See id.
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defendants facing allegations of violating Rule 10b-5 for Item
303 omissions. As discussed above, Item 303 omissions would still
need to satisfy the Basic standard of materiality.173 In fact, in
Stratte-McClure and Cohen, the plaintiffs’ claims failed because
they did not adequately plead scienter.174 Under the harmonized
reading, Item 303 omissions would become “fair game,” and yet,
the same set of rules, including all the difficulties in pleading
scienter relating to forward-looking statements, would apply.
CONCLUSION
The “judicial oak” of Rule 10b-5 private actions has had a
turbulent and interesting history. When the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals announced a split with its sister court in the Ninth
Circuit, a reaction was expected and natural. In this case, the
split may have been more mole hill than mountain.
Upon a closer look, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
based their decisions upon similar readings of the same cases.
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s basis for its claim that their
Stratte-McClure comments are “at odds with” the Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Cohen is unclear.175 The Second Circuit’s criticism of
Cohen and analysis of Oran were apparently persuasive enough
to convince the District Court in Minnesota to agree with the
court and (supposedly) disagree with the Ninth Circuit.176
No matter how persuasive the Second Circuit’s reasoning, however, it is clear that harmonizing the holdings in Stratte-McClure
and Cohen into a single coherent legal principle does not stretch
the limits of logical possibility.177 The Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits agree that the standards for Item 303’s disclosure requirement and a claim of securities fraud under the Rule 10b-5
See supra Part III.B.
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015)
(assuming that the omission was material, yet failing to find scienter pled
adequately); Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014)
(commenting that plaintiffs not only failed to plead materiality but also failed
to plead scienter).
175 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103.
176 Beaver City Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp.
3d 1035, 1047 (D. Minn. 2015).
177 See supra Part IV.
173
174
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differ significantly. 178 The courts also agree that information
that is required on Item 303 requires something more to give
rise to Rule 10b-5 liability.179 It seems that this is merely the
story of a circuit court split that simply never existed—but created quite a stir nonetheless.

Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102–03; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055; Oran v.
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000).
179 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055–56; Oran,
768 F.3d at 288 (quoting Alfus v. Pyramid Tech. Corp., 764 F. Supp. 598, 608
(N.D. Cal. 1991)).
178

